We investigate the phenomenon of sourcing co-created products. Specifically, we study how a multi-product downstream firm should source from the upstream market, that is single-source versus multi-source, in a situation where the products are co-created with the suppliers. We conceptualize co-creation as investments made at different hierarchical levels aimed at reducing the production costs incurred by the supplies. We also incorporate into our model the downstream firm's decision to establish a collaborative, knowledge-sharing environment for its suppliers. Outright purchase from the upstream market serves as a benchmark.
Introduction
Firms in B2B markets often develop innovative products with the help of their upstream suppliers.
Such co-creation of products benefits both the upstream supplier and the downstream firm. Most papers on co-creation in marketing and in user-design literature have focused on the incentives of the upstream firm to collaborate with its customers (Redstrom 2006 However, in their setup competing downstream firms decide whether and how to co-create with a monopolistic upstream supplier, and therefore they do not consider multi-sourcing or single-sourcing in the presence of co-creation, which is a key focus of the current paper. The literature on product sourcing has considered whether a downstream firm should source its products from one or multiple suppliers but has not considered product co-creation in conjunction with multi-sourcing.
In actual practice, where products are sourced from suppliers, the suppliers and/or firms often undertake relationship-specific investments. In fact, the knowledge-sharing and collaborative R&D across vertical levels is very common in international trade, with buyers in developed countries sharing their expertise with their suppliers in developing nations (Pack and Saggi 2001) . See Spencer (2005) for a survey of the literature on outsourcing. We contribute to this literature by incorporating endogenous R&D investment, both at the upstream and downstream levels, into the downstream firm's decision to single-source or multi-source such co-created products. For instance, Toyota works with different suppliers in North America to design tires for each of its car models (Liker and Choi 2004 ).
However, seats for both Camry sedan and Venza SUV are manufactured by Kentucky-based Johnson Controls with inputs from Toyota engineers.
When a downstream firm works closely with different suppliers, another decision it has to make is how much collaboration among the suppliers to establish. For example, Toyota started its US suppliers' association (Bluegrass Automotive Manufacturers Association) expressly to facilitate collaboration and knowledge sharing among its suppliers. The Big Three US automakers, on the other hand, are well known to foster rivalry, often unhealthy, among their suppliers. Such anecdotal evidence clearly suggests that downstream firms differ in how much collaboration among their upstream suppliers they would like to have. We analytically model the phenomenon of supplier collaboration in the context of co-creation.
Our research questions are: (1) What is the optimal sourcing strategy for a multi-product downstream firm that can choose to (a) either co-create with or purchase the products from its upstream supplier(s), and (b) do so either from a single or multiple suppliers? (2) What are the equilibrium levels of co-creation investments of the downstream firm and its supplier(s)? (3) If the downstream firm multi-sources the co-created products, will it prefer to establish a collaborative environment for its suppliers? (4) Are the incentives to multi-source co-created products weaker or stronger compared to the downstream firm's incentives to multi-source products simply purchased from the upstream market?
Said differently, how does co-creation change the incentives to multi-source?
Overview of Our Model and Results
We analyze a model where a monopolistic downstream firm sells two horizontally differentiated products, for example a car manufacturer sells both a mid-size sedan and an SUV. The downstream firm can choose to co-create its products with two different suppliers or with the same one. We conceptualize co-creation as investments made at different hierarchical levels aimed at reducing the production costs incurred by suppliers. In the case when the downstream firm sources its co-created products from two suppliers, it can establish an environment for them to collaborate. Outright purchase from the upstream market serves as a benchmark.
First, we find that counter to intuition the downstream firm may be worse off when its upstream suppliers collaborate. Intuitively, in a collaborative environment each supplier has an incentive to freeride on the investment of the other, thus decreasing the 'effective' investment at the upstream level.
When the cross-effect between the downstream and upstream investments (the second-order crosspartial derivative of the per unit production costs function) is large, the downstream firm is motivated to decrease its investment because the upstream suppliers will pick up the slack through their own increased investment. The negative free-riding effect is muted. When the cross-effect is small, the negative free-riding effect dominates, and this adversely affects the downstream firm's profit. Second, we show that when the downstream firm sources both products from a single supplier, it completely destroys the firm's incentives to invest. Multi-sourcing softens the holdup problem, leading to a positive level of investment by the downstream firm. This is because competition among the suppliers implies they cannot extract all the downstream firm's return on its co-creation investment.
Importantly, we find that the downstream firm's incentives to multi-source (versus single-source) are higher for co-created products than for non-co-created products.
Third, we find that for a commonly used additively separable cost function the optimal sourcing strategy for the downstream firm is multi-source co-creation without collaboration among the suppliers. Intuitively, co-creation allows the marginal costs of production to be very low because of the cost-reducing investments by both upstream suppliers and the downstream firm, and this dominates straight purchase. Moreover, by not having the upstream suppliers collaborate the downstream firm avoids the negative free-riding effect, and finally, by multi-sourcing it mitigates the holdup problem, which would be severe with single-sourcing.
Related Literature
Product co-creation is an increasingly important business phenomenon (Sawhney, Verona and Pran- partners also benefit from the upstream suppliers. For example, in automobile manufacturing the 'German Model' has OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) work very closely with their upstream suppliers, and in fact, the suppliers undertake a large part of the R&D investments leading to innovations (Calzolari et. al. 2015) . Japanese automobile manufacturers also work on joint R&D with their suppliers, especially to reduce production costs and to increase organizational learning (Cohen and . Since co-creation requires substantial relation-specific investments, our research also contributes to the work on the holdup problem that arises when the agents make relationship-specific investments before the prices are set (Grout 1984; Tirole 1986 ). The empirical evidence of the holdup problem has been much debated in the economics literature (Coase 2000; Klein 2000 ), but we show theoretically that the holdup problem persists even with co-created products.
Model Setup
Consider a downstream firm that sells two horizontally differentiated products located at the opposite ends of the unit interval that represents the product space. Product 1 is located at 0 and product 2 is located at 1. The demand side consists of infinitely many consumers of total mass one. Each consumer has a most preferred product x ∈ [0, 1], and hence derives the utility of v − tx from consuming product 1 and v −t(1−x) from consuming product 2. Consumers as represented by x are uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
There are two upstream suppliers. We analyze how the downstream firm co-creates its products with them. The firm can choose to co-create with only one supplier (single-sourcing) or with both suppliers (multi-sourcing). One of our contributions to the literature is that we investigate how cocreation changes the incentives of the downstream firm to either single or multi-source. Therefore, for purposes of comparison, we also analyze cases where there is outright purchase from suppliers without any co-creation.
Another contribution is to model whether the downstream firm will prefer to establish an environ-ment for its suppliers to collaborate when it co-creates with both of them. We assume that when the downstream firm merely purchases the products from two suppliers, it will not establish a collaborative environment. This is consistent with the idea that collaboration between two suppliers is easier to implement when both are working closely with the downstream firm. Hence, the possible strategies of the downstream firm are:
(A) Multi-Source Co-Creation: co-create product 1 with one supplier and product 2 with another supplier, possibly establishing an environment for the two suppliers to collaborate; (B) Single-Source Co-Creation: co-create both products with one supplier; (C) Multi-Source Purchase: purchase product 1 from one supplier and product 2 from another supplier;
(D) Single-Source Purchase: purchase both products from one supplier.
In this paper we study the situation where co-creation is aimed at enhancing the production effi- ). This conceptualization of the results of joint R&D is identical to Levin and Reiss (1988) , wherein the investment x by a firm and X by its linked collaborator result in a unit variable cost of c(x, X) for the firm.
The cost function c(e, I) possess the following characteristics that are standard in the literature: ∂c/∂e < 0, ∂c/∂I < 0, ∂ 2 c/∂e 2 > 0, ∂ 2 c/∂I 2 > 0, and ∂ 2 c/∂e∂I ≥ 0. These characteristics simply mean that co-creation investments lower the production costs, but at a decreasing rate. Such costreducing, rather than value-enhancing, co-creation is consistent with our assumption of horizontally differentiated products.
In the next four sections we analyze strategies A through D. The question of which strategy is the most profitable for the downstream firm gets answered in Section 7. The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
Strategy A: Multi-Source Co-Creation
Under strategy A the downstream firm (F) co-creates product 1 with one supplier (S1) and product 2 with another supplier (S2). As we have already mentioned, in this situation the downstream firm can choose whether to have its suppliers collaborate or not. We assume that this is a dichotomous choice. Of course, we allow the suppliers to either accept of reject the downstream firm's exhortation to collaborate depending on their own incentives. In other words, there is no forced collaboration, even though in some practical situations the downstream firm makes forced collaboration a pre-condition (Wiener and Saunders 2014). Below is the timeline.
1. F decides whether to establish, at a fixed cost Γ, an environment in which S1 and S2 are given an opportunity to collaborate.
2. If the collaborative environment is in place, S1 and S2 simultaneously choose whether to collaborate or not. Only if both suppliers choose to collaborate, there will be collaboration between them.
3. Simultaneously and independently, S1 and S2 choose their investment levels I 1 and I 2 , and F chooses its investment level e. In the absence of collaboration between the suppliers, the (per unit) costs of producing product 1 and product 2 are c 1 = c(e, I 1 ) and c 2 = c(e, I 2 ), respectively. When there is collaboration between S1 and S2, the costs are c 1 = c(e, I 1 + γI 2 ) and c 2 = c(e, I 2 + γI 1 ), where γ ∈ (0, 1) represents the intensity of collaboration between two different suppliers. We will refer to this stage as the product co-creation stage.
4. S1 and S2 simultaneously choose their wholesale prices p w 1 and p w 2 . We will refer to this stage as the wholesale pricing stage.
5. F chooses its retail prices p 1 and p 2 . We will refer to this stage as the retail pricing stage.
6. Consumers make their purchasing decisions.
The first two stages capture the idea that establishing an overall collaborative environment is a longer-term and more irreversible decision than specific investments and pricing. In the equilibrium analysis that follows we will assume that v is high enough so that the market is fully covered.
Note that we have assumed linear pricing by the suppliers. Often non-linear pricing is used in a vertical relationship in order to avoid the double marginalization problem. In our model there is no distortion related to double marginalization since the market size is fixed. As we will see, in equilibrium, the downstream firm sets the prices for its two products just low enough to capture all consumers on the unit interval.
Wholesale and Retail Pricing Stages
We start our analysis with the retail pricing stage, in which F, given p w 1 and p w 2 , chooses p 1 and p 2 . The results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Retail Prices). Given p w 1 and p w 2 , F sets its retail prices to
Consumers with x <x purchase product 1, the rest purchase product 2, wherê
Proceeding with backward induction, we analyze the wholesale pricing stage, in which S1 and S2, given c 1 and c 2 , simultaneously choose p w 1 and p w 2 . We record the obtained Nash equilibrium prices in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Wholesale Prices). Given c 1 and c 2 , S1 and S2 set their wholesale prices to
respectively.
We use Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to derive the intermediate -after the co-creation investments have been made -profits of S1, S2, and F as functions of c 1 and c 2 .
Lemma 3 (Intermediate Profits under a Multi-Source Strategy). Suppose F sources the two products from different suppliers. Then the intermediate profits of S1, S2, and F as functions of c 1 and c 2 are
The superscript 'ms' stands for 'multi-source.' Note that this lemma not only applies to strategy A, but also to strategy C (Multi-Source Purchase).
Product Co-Creation Stage
We now analyze the product co-creation stage, in which S1, S2, and F simultaneously choose cocreation their investments I 1 , I 2 , and e. Suppose there is collaboration between S1 and S2. S1, therefore, solves max
S2 solves max
and F solves max e π ms F (c(e, I 1 + γI 2 ), c(e, I 2 + γI 1 )) − e.
We take the first-order conditions to find the equilibrium values of I 1 , I 2 , and e. The results are summarized in Lemma 4. The superscript 'C' stands for 'collaboration.'
Lemma 4 (Investments under Strategy A: Collaboration). Under strategy A, when S1 and S2 collaborate, they choose the investment levels I 1 = I 2 = I C , while F chooses the investment level e C . I C and e C are implicitly defined by
∂c(e C , I C + γI C ) ∂e = 1
LetĨ C ≡ I C +γI C denote the 'effective' investment of the upstream suppliers. In Proposition 1 we examine the effect of collaboration parameter γ on co-creation investmentsĨ C and e C . Interestingly, we find that higher levels of γ may be associated with lower levels of the effective investmentĨ C , despite the positive direct effect of γ onĨ C .
Proposition 1 (Comparative Statics w.r.t. Collaboration Parameter γ). As γ increases,Ĩ C decreases and e C increases if
I C increases and e C decreases if otherwise.
Observe that the inequality (1) is more likely to hold when the second-order cross partial derivative ∂ 2 c/(∂e∂I) is small relative to the second-order partial derivatives ∂ 2 c/∂e 2 and ∂ 2 c/∂I 2 . There are three forces at work. First, there is a positive direct effect of γ onĨ C , asĨ C = I C +γI C . Second, there is a negative free-riding effect of γ on I C , and hence onĨ C . Because there is collaboration among the suppliers, each supplier has an incentive to free-ride on the other, and this incentive is stronger for higher levels of collaboration. The suppliers operate in a competitive environment: any investment by a given supplier not only reduces its own marginal cost, but also the marginal cost of its rival, more so for higher values of γ. Again, each supplier is motivated to reduce its investment as γ increases.
Third, there are externalities among the suppliers and the downstream firm, owing to the assumption ∂ 2 c/(∂e∂I) > 0. Positivity of the cross-partial derivative implies that the marginal effect of the cost-reducing investment by the upstream suppliers are higher the lower is e C . Therefore, lower (higher) values of e C strengthen (weaken) the upstream suppliers' incentives to invest.
When the externality effect (the cross-partial derivative ∂ 2 c/(∂e∂I)) is large, the downstream firm is motivated to decrease its investment because the upstream suppliers will pick up the slack through their own increased investment. The externality effect then softens the negative free-riding effect.
For large enough externality effect, this increase in investment by the upstream supplies may reduce the negative free-riding effect enough so that the positive direct effect dominates (the second part of Proposition 1).
However, when the externality effect is small, it is not enough to reduce the free-riding effect at the upstream level sufficiently, and the downstream firm has to pick up the slack. The net result is that when γ increases, the upstream suppliers reduce their investments because of the dominant free-riding effect (the first part of Proposition 1).
Note that if the cost function is additively separable, c(e, I) = f (e) + g(I), the cross-partial derivative is zero. Therefore, the effective investment of the upstream suppliers decreases as γ increases, which is undesirable for the downstream firm. This foreshadows the fact that for additively separable costs the downstream firm may not want to establish a collaborative environment among the upstream suppliers. We address this case in Section 3.3 and then later in Section 7.
Finally, we calculate the downstream firm's profit under strategy A with collaboration:
Now suppose there is no collaboration between the suppliers. To obtain the equilibrium levels of co-creation investments under strategy A without collaboration, we set γ to zero in Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 (Investments under Strategy A: No Collaboration).
Under strategy A, when S1 and S2 do not collaborate, they choose the investment levels I 1 = I 2 = I N C , while F chooses the investment level e N C . I N C and e N C are implicitly defined by
∂c(e N C , I N C ) ∂e = 1
The superscript 'NC' stands for 'no collaboration.' The downstream firm's profit under strategy A without collaboration is
Should the Downstream Firm Establish a Collaborative Environment?
Once offered an opportunity to collaborate, the two suppliers will collaborate if and only if
Thus, the downstream firm should establish a collaborative environment if (4) holds and at the same time Π C F ≥ Π N C F . The latter can be simplified to
For the special case of an additively separable cost function, we can make a sharp prediction about the downstream firm's incentives to establish a collaborative environment for its suppliers. Suppose c(e, I) = f (e) + g(I), with f (e) < 0, g (e) < 0, f (e) > 0, and g (e) > 0. Applying the results of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5
to c(e, I) = f (e) + g(I) yields
It immediately follows that e C = e N C . Since (1) holds for an additively separable cost function,Ĩ C decreases in γ (Proposition 1), implyingĨ C < I N C . Hence, c(e C ,Ĩ C ) > c(e N C , I N C ).
Comparing (2) with (3) we immediately see that Π N C F is higher than Π C F even if Γ is zero.
Proposition 2 (No Collaboration among Suppliers for Additively Separable Costs).
In the case of an additively separable cost function, the downstream firm obtains a higher profit under strategy A without collaboration than under strategy A with collaboration, even if the fixed cost of establishing a collaborative environment Γ is zero.
An additively separable cost function has zero cross-partial derivative: ∂ 2 c/(∂e∂I) = 0, meaning there are no cross-effects between the downstream firm's and the suppliers' investments in co-creation.
As shown in Proposition 1, for such cost functions the suppliers' effective investmentĨ C decreases as the intensity of collaboration γ increases, while the downstream firm's investment remains the same (the externality effect is 'turned off'). If so, the downstream firm is better off in a non-collaborative environment. The main point of Proposition 2 is to show that this intuition is valid even when all prices are endogenized. That is, strategy A without collaboration dominates the one with collaboration.
Later in Section 7 we analyze the entire game where the downstream firm chooses its optimal sourcing strategy from strategies A through D. We show that additive separability does not conflict with the conditions under which the downstream firm prefers strategy A to all the others.
Strategy B: Single-Source Co-Creation
Under strategy B the downstream firm co-creates both products with one supplier (S). Below is the timeline.
1. Simultaneously and independently, S chooses its investment levels I 1 and I 2 , and F chooses its investment level e. The costs of producing product 1 and product 2 are c 1 = c(e, I 1 + δI 2 ) and c 2 = c(e, I 2 + δI 1 ), respectively, where δ ∈ (0, 1) represents the knowledge spillover between two products produced by the same supplier. Further, we assume that δ ≥ γ, which is consistent with the idea that knowledge spillover between two R&D processes is stronger when the products are developed by the same supplier than when they are developed by different but collaborating suppliers.
2. S chooses its wholesale prices p w 1 and p w 2 .
3. F chooses its retail prices p 1 and p 2 .
If p w 1 and p w 2 are too high, then F's optimal choice of p 1 and p 2 will result in some consumers not buying at all. It is easy to show that in equilibrium S chooses p w 1 and p w 2 just low enough to avoid such an outcome. The detailed analysis of the retail and wholesale pricing stages under strategy B -a 
respectively.
It is left to determine the equilibrium levels of I 1 , I 2 and e. F solves
Note that the higher is the difference in the production costs, the higher is F's profit. In the Appendix we show that the difference in the production costs in F's profit function given above is decreasing in e. Therefore, the equilibrium level of investment by the downstream firm is zero.
Proposition 3 (No Investment by the Downstream Firm under Single-Source Co-Creation).
When the downstream firm co-creates both products with the same supplier, in equilibrium the firm will choose zero level of co-creation investment.
Proposition 3 is substantively important. It shows that the holdup problem, which refers to distortions in investment levels when relationship-specific investments are made prior to price setting, also exists in the world of co-created products. The reason for under-investment in the standard holdup problem is that an agent's partner expropriates part of the return on its sunk investment, and anticipating this the agent lowers her investment below desirable levels. For the first formal proof of the under-investment hypothesis, please see Grout (1984) and Tirole (1986).
As we have just seen, when the downstream firm co-creates with a single supplier it has no incentives to invest. On the contrary, when F co-creates with both suppliers (strategy A) it chooses a positive level of investment. This is because competition among the suppliers implies they cannot extract all the downstream firm's return on its co-creation investment. Thus, with co-created products multi-sourcing is a means of softening the holdup problem for the downstream firm.
We will make a comparison of whether the downstream firm has stronger or weaker incentives to multi-source with co-created products, compared to non-co-created ones, after analyzing the benchmark cases of single and multi-sourcing with non-co-created products (strategies C and D, where we assume there is no investment by the downstream firm). The result stated in Proposition 3, that singlesourcing of co-created products completely destroys the downstream firm's incentives to invest, is an endogenous outcome of our analysis compared to the exogenously imposed lack of investment by the downstream firm in the case of non-co-created products.
To find S's equilibrium investment levels, we solve
The results are summarized in the Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 (Investments under Strategy B).
Under strategy B, F chooses zero investment level, while S chooses the investment levels I 1 = I 2 = I * , where I * is implicitly defined by
The downstream firm's profit under strategy B is
Despite the fact that the knowledge spillover is stronger when the products are developed by the same supplier than by different ones (δ ≥ γ), the downstream firm's profit under strategy B is dominated by its profit under strategy A, with or without collaboration (see (2) and (3)). This is because under strategy A the downstream firm enjoys lower wholesale prices due to the competition at the upstream level.
Later in Section 7 we will compare the profits of the downstream firm under all four strategies A through D.
Strategy C: Multi-Source Purchase
Under strategy C the downstream firm purchases product 1 from one supplier (S1) and product 2 from another supplier (S2). Below is the timeline.
1. S1 and S2 simultaneously choose their investment levels I 1 and I 2 . The costs of producing product 1 and product 2 are c 1 = c(0, I 1 ) and c 2 = c(0, I 2 ), respectively.
2. S1 and S2 simultaneously choose their wholesale prices p w 1 and p w 2 .
Like strategy A, strategy C is a multi-source strategy; it leads to the same intermediate profit 
Lemma 8 (Investments under Strategy C).
Under strategy C, S1 and S2 choose the investment levels I 1 = I 2 = I † , where I † is implicitly defined by
The downstream firm's profit under strategy C is
6 Strategy D: Single-Source Purchase
Under strategy D the downstream firm purchases both products from one supplier (S). Below is the timeline.
1. S chooses its investment levels I 1 and I 2 . The costs of producing product 1 and product 2 are c 1 = c(0, I 1 + δI 2 ) and c 2 = c(0, I 2 + δI 1 ), respectively, with δ ∈ (γ, 1].
2. S chooses its wholesale prices p w 1 and p w 2 . 
where I C and e C are defined in Lemma 4
where I N C and e N C are defined in Lemma 5
where I † is defined in Lemma 8
Strategies B and D Π * F = t 2 3. F chooses its retail prices p 1 and p 2 .
Because of the earlier result that under strategy B the downstream firm has no incentives to invest (Proposition 3), strategy D is payoff equivalent to strategy B. It is interesting to find that the downstream firm's profit under single-source co-creation is the same as that under single-source purchase.
The Most Profitable Strategy for the Downstream Firm
In comparing strategies A through D, we adopt the viewpoint of the downstream firm. We gathered the firm's profits (2), (3), (5) and (6) in Table 1 .
First note that for sufficiently high values of v the single-source strategies B and D, with and without co-creation respectively, become inferior. In this section, we will consider the case of an additively separable cost function: c(e, I) = f (e) + g(I), with f (e) < 0, g (e) < 0, f (e) > 0, and g (e) > 0.
We already know from Proposition 2 that in this case strategy A without collaboration dominates the one with. How does strategy A without collaboration compare with strategy C? To make sharper predictions of the most profitable strategy, in the next proposition we assume a very commonly used cost function, keeping in mind that in our analysis, investments reduce the marginal costs of produc- incentives to multi-source with co-created products than with non-co-created ones.
By incentives to multi-source we mean the increase in the downstream firm's profit due to multisourcing compared to single-sourcing. The result in the above proposition seems counter-intuitive at first. With non-co-created products the downstream firm often prefers multi-sourcing to singlesourcing since multi-sourcing reduces the dependence on a single suppler. One may think that since co-creation implies that the downstream firm internalizes some of the production, it is not as dependent on its suppliers. This would then imply that co-creation may reduce the motivation of the downstream firm to multi-source.
However, our analysis shows that the opposite is true: Co-creation increases the downstream firm's incentives to multi-source. This is because in the world of co-created products multi-sourcing has two advantages over single-sourcing: lower input (wholesale) prices due to the competition at the upstream level and alleviation of the holdup problem (see the discussion after Proposition 3). In the world of nonco-created products, multi-sourcing has one advantage over single-sourcing, that of lower wholesale prices.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the phenomenon of sourcing co-created products. A multi-product downstream firm can source products from a single or from multiple suppliers. It can also choose whether to co-create the products with one or more suppliers or to just purchase the products from the upstream market. Finally, if the downstream firm does source the co-created products from multiple suppliers, it could foster collaboration among the suppliers by, for example, playing an active role in suppliers'
associations. Thus, firms nowadays are confronted with a very complex decision when it comes to sourcing the products they sell to the end consumers.
The literature on product sourcing has considered the issue of single-sourcing versus multi-sourcing, but only for non-co-created standard products. We contribute to this literature by investigating how a downstream firm should source products it co-creates with its suppliers. Another novel contribution is incorporating the decision of whether the downstream firm should establish a collaborative environment for its upstream suppliers. We add to the literature on product co-creation by considering how a firm should source such co-created products.
Co-creation of products has been steadily growing in practice. In many B2B settings a large part of product and production related R&D is increasingly jointly carried out by upstream suppliers and downstream firms. For example, in the automobile industry OEMs work very closely with their suppliers to improve the design of cars and components thereof (Calzolari et. al. 2015) . Parallel to the increase in co-creation as a business practice, especially in B2B markets, there is also an acceleration in the practice of outsourcing fueled by advances in procurement techniques. By some estimates, almost 55% of the earned revenue of a manufacturing firm is accounted for by purchased material (Burke, Carillo and Vakharia 2007) . Thus, in studying a downstream firm's sourcing strategies it is important to also understand how it would do sourcing when it co-creates with the upstream suppliers.
Our research addresses this question.
In terms of managerial implications, we show that the downstream firm may be worse off when the upstream suppliers collaborate, due to the fact that as the intensity of collaboration increases, the downstream firm's investment could increase and the upstream suppliers' investments could decrease.
The only situation where the downstream firm would like to establish a collaborative environment for its upstream suppliers is when the cross-effect of its and its suppliers' investments is very large. Thus, managers should very closely study how their and their supplier's joint investments reduce costs before they decide whether or not to have their suppliers collaborate. This is a new insight from our analysis.
We also show that single-sourcing of co-created products completely destroys the incentives to invest by the downstream firm. Multi-sourcing softens the holdup problem, resulting in a positive investment by the downstream firm. Importantly, we find that the downstream firm's incentives to multi-source (versus single-source) are stronger for co-created products compared to non-co-created products. One might speculate that because co-creation implies that the downstream firm internalizes some of the production, it would do well to have fewer but deeper relationships with upstream suppliers, and thus conclude that the downstream firm's incentives to multi-source are weaker for cocreated products. Such naive thinking ignores the endogenous investments which also change when the downstream firm switches from single-sourcing to multi-sourcing.
We have considered co-creation as cost-reducing R&D jointly carried out by the downstream and upstream levels. Future work could consider demand-creating R&D and also competition at the downstream level. We put the three first-order conditions into a system of equations to solve for the equilibrium values of I 1 , I 2 and e. Obviously, in equilibrium S1 and S2 will choose the same level of investment; we denote it by I C . Let e C denote the equilibrium level of F's investment. I C and e C must satisfy
Proof of Proposition 1
It follows from Lemma 3 thatĨ C and e C are implicitly defined by
∂c(e C ,Ĩ C )
Taking the total derivative with respect to γ yields
This is a linear system of equations with respect to de C /dγ and dĨ C /dγ:
Recall that ∂c/∂e < 0, ∂c/∂I < 0, ∂ 2 c/∂e 2 > 0, ∂ 2 c/∂I 2 > 0, and ∂ 2 c/∂e∂I > 0. We can rewrite our system of equations as
where
and
are all positive. Solving the system of equations for de C /dγ and dĨ C /dγ yields
Therefore, when C 1 C 4 − C 2 C 3 > 0, de C /dγ is positive and dĨ C /dγ is negative. Otherwise, de C /dγ is negative and dĨ C /dγ is positive.
Substituting the constraint into the objective function yields The higher is the difference in the production costs, the higher is F's profit. Suppose for definitiveness I 2 > I 1 . Then |c(e, I 1 + δI 2 ) − c(e, I 2 + δI 1 )| = c(e, I 1 + δI 2 ) − c(e, I 2 + δI 1 ) and ∂ ∂e (c(e, I 1 + δI 2 ) − c(e, I 2 + δI 1 )) = − Depending on the parameters t and δ, as well as the functional from of the cost function, we can either get a symmetric solution, or two asymmetric ones. We are going to assume that δ is sufficiently close to one, so that the solution is symmetric: I 1 = I 2 = I * . I * must satisfy − 1 2 (1 + δ) ∂c(0, I * + δI * ) ∂I = 1.
Proof of Lemma 8
S1 solves max Obviously, in equilibrium S1 and S2 will choose the same level of investment; we denote it by I † . I † must satisfy − 1 64t (22t − c(0, I † )) ∂c(0, I † ) ∂I = 1.
S2 solves max

Proof of Proposition 4
With c(e, I) =c − a √ e − b √ I, the system of equations in Lemma 5 becomes Observe that I N C > I † . It immediately follows that strategy A without collaboration dominates strategy C. Indeed, the downstream firm F can choose e = 0 under strategy A without collaboration and get a higher profit than under strategy C. Since e = e N C is F's best response to I 1 = I 2 = I N C , F's equilibrium profit under strategy A without collaboration is even higher.
